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T
he state of the labor market, employment and unemployment, plays
an important role in the deliberations of policymakers, the Federal
Reserve Bank included. Over the last 30 years, economic theory has
led to substantial progress in understanding the mechanics of business cycles.
Much of this progress in macroeconomics has been associated with the use of
calibrated dynamic equilibrium models for the quantitative analysis of aggre-
gate ﬂuctuations (Prescott [1986]). These advances have mainly proceeded
within the Walrasian framework of frictionless markets. For the labor mar-
ket, this means that while these theories contribute to our understanding of
employment determination, they have nothing to say about unemployment.
Policymakers care about the behavior of unemployment for at least two
reasons. First,evenifoneismainlyinterestedinthedeterminationofemploy-
ment, unemployment might represent a necessary transitional state if frictions
impede the allocation of labor among production opportunities. Second, job
lossandtheassociatedunemploymentspellrepresentamajorsourceofincome
risk to individuals.
Over the past two decades, the search and matching framework has
acquired the status of the standard theory of equilibrium unemployment.1
This theory is built on the idea that trade in the labor market is costly and
takes time. Frictions originating from imperfect information, heterogeneity
We wish to thank Kartik Athreya, Sam Malek, Leo Martinez, and Ned Prescott for helpful
comments. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 For a textbook survey, see Pissarides (2000).
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 91/3 Summer 2005 1920 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of ﬁrms and workers, and lack of coordination disrupt the ability to form
employment relationships. The quantity of idle inputs in the labor market
(unemployed workers and vacant jobs) is a measure of such disruption. In
its most basic representation, a labor market matching model focuses on the
interaction between unemployment and job creation. Higher productivity in-
creasesthereturntojobcreationandtherebyincreasestherateofjobcreation.
In turn, a higher rate of job creation makes it easier for unemployed workers
to ﬁnd jobs and thereby reduces unemployment. This explains the observed
counter-cyclical (pro-cyclical) behavior of unemployment (job creation).
Shimer (2005) goes beyond investigating the qualitative features of the
basic matching model. He follows the research program on dynamic equilib-
rium models with Walrasian frictionless markets and explores whether or not
a calibrated matching model of the labor market is quantitatively consistent
withobservedaggregateﬂuctuations. Hesurprisinglyconcludesthatareason-
ably calibrated matching model does not generate enough volatility in unem-
ployment and cannot explain the strong procyclicality of the job-ﬁnding rate.
In other words, the matching model stops short of reproducing the cyclical
behavior of its two central elements: unemployment and vacancies.2
In this article, we present the basic matching model, also known as the
Mortensen-Pissarides model, in detail and, building on Shimer (2005), we
explain the reasons for the quantitative problems of the model. Essentially,
given the way wages are determined in the (Nash-bargaining) model and the
way Nash bargaining is calibrated, wages respond strongly to changes in pro-
ductivity so that the incentive for ﬁrms to create jobs does not change very
much. We then discuss two possible ways of reconciling a matching model
with the data.
First,asarguedbyHall(2005)andShimer(2004),ifwagesareessentially
rigid, the model performs much better. We contend that rigid wages per se
are not sufﬁcient; another necessary requirement is a very large labor share—
close to 100 percent of output. Moreover, we show that with rigid wages, the
model has implications for the labor share that seem too extreme: the labor
sharebecomesperfectlynegativelycorrelatedwith—andasvolatileas—labor
productivity whereas in the data this correlation is −0.5, and the variation of
the share is not nearly as large as that of productivity.
Second, as suggested by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005), without aban-
doning Nash bargaining, a different calibration of some key parameters of the
2 We should note that Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) were the ﬁrst to integrate the
matching approach to the labor market into an otherwise standard Walrasian model and to evaluate
this model quantitatively. Their work, however, was not so much focused on the model’s ability to
match the behavior of unemployment, but on how the introduction of labor market frictions affects
the ability of the otherwise standard Walrasian model to explain movements in employment, hours
worked, and other non-labor-market variables. Andolfatto (1996), however, also pointed out the
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modelalsoallowsonetoraisethevolatilityofunemploymentandvacanciesin
the model. For this calibration to work, however, one again needs a very high
wage share. This high share is obtained by “artiﬁcially” raising the outside
option of the worker through generous unemployment beneﬁts.3 We tenta-
tively conclude, as do Costain and Reiter (2003), that this parameterization
has implausible implications for the impact of unemployment beneﬁts on the
equilibrium unemployment rate: a 15 percent rise in beneﬁts would double
the unemployment rate.
Why is a very large (very small) wage share (proﬁt share) so important in
orderforthemodeltohaveastrongampliﬁcationmechanismforvacanciesand
unemployment? The model has a free-entry condition stating that vacancies
are created until discounted proﬁts equal the cost of entry. If proﬁts are
very small in equilibrium, a positive productivity shock induces a very large
percentageincreaseinproﬁts,andhencealargenumberofnewvacanciesmust
be created—through ﬁrm entry—thus lowering the rate of ﬁnding workers
enough that entry remains an activity with zero net payoff.
Weconcludethatneitheroneofthesolutionsproposedisfullysatisfactory,
for two reasons. First, they both have ﬁrst-order counterfactual implications.
Second, they both assume a very large value for the labor share. It is hard
to assess whether this value is plausible because there is no physical capital
in the baseline matching model. We speculate that the addition of physical
capital, besides providing a natural way of measuring the labor share of
aggregate income, would allow the analysis of another important source of
aggregate ﬂuctuations, investment-speciﬁc shocks, which have proved suc-
cessful in Walrasian models.4
The present article, which can be read both as an introduction to the
matching model of unemployment and as a way of understanding the recent
discussions of the model’s quantitative implications, is organized as follows.
We ﬁrst quickly describe the data. Next, we describe in Section 2 the basic
model without aggregate shocks. In Section 3, we deﬁne and solve for a sta-
tionary equilibrium: a steady state. In Section 4, we brieﬂy discuss transition
dynamics within the model without shocks. In Section 5, we derive the qual-
itative comparative statics for a one-time permanent change of the model’s
parameters. In Section 6, we present the alternative calibration strategies one
could follow to parameterize the matching model, and in Section 7, we show
how the quantitative comparative statics results differ according to the model
3 To be precise, a large wage share is also sufﬁcient for a strong ampliﬁcation mechanism with
rigid wages. With ﬂexible wages, the large wage share must be achieved by making unemployment
beneﬁts high.
4 See Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) and Fisher (2003) for a quantitative account
of the role of this type of shock in U.S. business cycles over the postwar period. Costain and
Reiter (2003) illustrate quantitatively that productivity shocks affecting only new jobs improve the
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Table 1 Aggregate Statistics: 1951:1–2004:4
HP Smoothing Parameter: 105
uvθ λ w ws p
Standard Deviation 0.20 0.23 0.38 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.02
Autocorrelation 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.89
Correlation with p −0.40 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.69 −0.35 1.00
HP Smoothing Parameter: 1600
uvθ λ w ws p
Standard Deviation 0.13 0.14 0.26 NA 0.01 0.01 0.01
Autocorrelation 0.87 0.90 0.89 NA 0.81 0.77 0.76
Correlation with p −0.29 0.45 0.38 NA 0.72 −0.61 1.000
Notes: Data are quarterly, and u is the unemployment rate of the civilian population; v
is the help-wanted advertising index; θ = v/u is labor market tightness; p is output per
employee in the nonfarm business sector; s is the labor share constructed as the ratio of
compensation of employees to output in the nonfarm sector; w is the wage computed as
labor share times labor productivity, i.e., w = s·p. The statistics for the job-ﬁnding rate,
λw, are those reported in Shimer (2005) for an HP smoothing parameter of 105.
calibration. In Section 8, we introduce explicit stochastic aggregate shocks
and discuss how the quantitative comparative statics results for one-time per-
manent shocks have to be modiﬁed to account for persistent but temporary
shocks. Section 9 concludes the article.
1. THE DATA
The focus of the analysis is on ﬂuctuations at the business-cycle frequencies,
and hence low-frequency movements in the data should be ﬁltered out. For
quarterly data, the standard practice (followed by Andolfatto and Merz) is to
use a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter set to 1600.
Shimer (2005) chooses a much smoother trend component, corresponding to
an HP smoothing parameter of 105.
Table 1 summarizes the key labor market facts around which this article
is centered. We report statistics for the detrended log-levels of each series.
When we remove a very smooth trend (smoothing parameter 105), we can
summarize the data as follows:
• Unemployment and Vacancies. First, unemployment, u, and vacan-
cies, v, are about 10 times more volatile than labor productivity, p.
Market tightness, θ, deﬁned as the ratio of vacancies to unemploy-
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positively correlated with labor productivity. Both unemployment and
vacancies show strong autocorrelation.
• Job-FindingRates. Thejob-ﬁndingrate,λw,issixtimesmorevolatile
than productivity and is pro-cyclical. It is also strongly autocorrelated.
• Wages and Labor Share. Wages and the labor share are roughly as
volatileaslaborproductivity. Thecorrelationbetweenwagesandlabor
productivity is high but signiﬁcantly less than one, and the labor share
is countercyclical.
Using a more volatile trend component (lower smoothing parameter) has
almost no effect on the relative volatilities. For the vast majority of the var-
iables, the percentage standard deviation is reduced roughly by one-third.
Interestingly,thevolatilityiscutinhalfforwagesandthelaborshare. Overall,
the autocorrelation of the series is reduced, since some of the persistence is
absorbed by the more variable HP trend. Finally, the correlation structure of
theserieswithlaborproductivityis,ingeneral,unchangedexceptforthelabor
share whose negative correlation almost doubles.
We conclude that the choice of smoothing parameter has no impact on the
unemployment and vacancy statistics but does affect the labor share statistics
somewhat.
2. THE MODEL
We now outline and discuss the basic Mortensen-Pissarides matching model
with exogenous separations.5 We choose a formulation in continuous time
in order to simplify some of the derivations. It is useful to ﬁrst describe the
stationary economy (when aggregate productivity is constant over time) be-
cause that model is simple and yet very informative about how the model with
random shocks behaves. Later, we will brieﬂy discuss aggregate ﬂuctuations
with stochastic productivity shocks that are persistent but not permanent.6
Workers and Firms
Thereisaﬁxednumberofworkersintheeconomy;themodeldoesnotconsider
variations in the labor force or in the effort or amount of time worked by each
5 The main reference is Pissarides (1985). Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) extend the model
to endogenous separations. Pissarides (2000) contains an excellent survey of the matching models.
See also Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for a recent survey.
6 The view that aggregate ﬂuctuations in output and unemployment are due to ﬂuctuations in
productivity is not essential here. For the given environment, one can interpret productivity shocks
as actually representing another source of ﬂuctuations (such as “demand shocks,” e.g., shocks to
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worker. For example, think of workers as being uniformly distributed on the
interval [0,1]—for any point on this interval, there is one worker—though
there is no particular meaning to a worker’s position on the interval.
Workers are all the same from the perspective of both their productivity
and their preferences. Workers are inﬁnitely lived and have linear utility
over consumption of a homogeneous good, meaning that to the extent that
there is uncertainty, workers are risk-neutral. There is constant (exponential)
discounting at rate r. One can therefore think of a worker’s expected present
value of utility as simply the expected present value of income.7
Workers are either employed or unemployed. An employed worker earns
wageincome,w,butcannotsearch. Unemployedworkerssearchforjobs. Let
b>0 denote the income equivalent of the utility ﬂow that a worker obtains in
thenonworkingactivitywhenunemployed, e.g., themonetaryvalueofleisure
plus unemployment beneﬁts net of search costs.8
A ﬁrm is a job. The supply of ﬁrms (jobs) is potentially inﬁnite. Every
ﬁrm is equally productive at any point in time. Firms are risk-neutral and they
discount future income at the same rate as do workers. Production requires
one worker and one ﬁrm; ﬁrms can really be thought of as another type of
labor input, such as an “entrepreneur.” A ﬁrm-worker pair produces p units
of the homogeneous output per unit of time. We assume that the value of
production for a pair always exceeds the value of not working for a worker,
i.e., that p>b>0.9 There is no cost for a ﬁrm to enter the labor market.
The Frictional Labor Market
In a “frictional” labor market, ﬁrms and workers do not meet instantaneously.
In addition, ﬁrms that want to meet workers have to use resources to post a
vacancy. In particular, a ﬁrm has to pay c units of output per unit of time it
posts a “vacancy.” Let the number of idle ﬁrms that have an open position
be denoted v(t),and let the number of unemployed workers be u(t). Lack of
coordination, partial information, and heterogeneity of vacancies and workers
are all factors that make trading in the labor market costly.
Wedonotmodeltheselabormarketfrictionsexplicitlybutusetheconcept
ofamatchingfunctionasareducedformrepresentationofthefrictions.10 This
7Alternatively, one could assume that workers are risk-averse but that they can obtain com-
plete insurance against idiosyncratic income risk. In this case, it would also be optimal for workers
to maximize the expected present value of income.
8 Note that unemployment beneﬁts do not serve an insurance role in this environment since
workers are either risk-neutral or they already obtain complete insurance.
9 This condition is necessary for ruling out a trivial equilibrium with zero employment: if
b>p ,no worker would be willing to work even if she could extract the entire value of the
output produced from the ﬁrm.
10 The concept of an “aggregate matching function” has been around for some time. In their
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formulation speciﬁes that the rate at which new matches, m, are created is
given by a time-invariant function, M, of the number of unemployed workers
searching for a job and the number of vacant positions: m = M(u,v). At this
point, we will assume that M is (1) increasing and strictly concave in each
argumentseparatelyand(2)constantreturnstoscale(CRS)inbotharguments.
Thus,matchesaremorelikelywhenmoreworkersandﬁrmsaresearching,but
holding constant the size of one of the searching groups, there are decreasing
marginal returns in matching.
NewmatchesareformedaccordingtoPoissonprocesseswitharrivalrates
λw and λf. Given the rate at which new matches are formed, the rate at which
an unemployed worker meets a ﬁrm is simply λw(t) = m(t)/u(t), the total
number of successful matches per worker searching. Similarly, the rate at
whichavacantﬁrmmeetsaworkerisλf(t) = m(t)/v(t). Sincethematching
function is CRS, the two meeting rates depend on labor market tightness,
θ (t) = v (t)/u(t), only:
λw (t) = M [1,θ(t)] and λf (t) = M [1/θ (t),1]. (1)
As the relative number of vacancies increases, the job-ﬁnding rate, λw, also
increases, but the worker-ﬁnding rate, λf, decreases. We assume that once a
ﬁrm and a worker have been matched, they remain matched until “separation”
occurs. Separation occurs according to a Poisson process with exogenous
arrival rate, σ.
If an unemployed worker meets vacant ﬁrms according to a Poisson pro-
cesswitharrivalrate,λw,thentheprobabilitythattheworkermeetsexactlyone
vacant ﬁrm during a time period,  , is λw  if the time period is sufﬁciently
short. Furthermore, the probability that a worker meets two or more vacant
ﬁrms during this time period is essentially zero.11 Similarly, the probability
that a vacant ﬁrm meets an unemployed worker is λf , and the probability
that a matched ﬁrm-worker pair separates is σ . Thus, if we start out with
u(t) unemployed workers and 1 − u(t) employed workers at time t, after a
short time period,  ,the number of unemployed workers will be
u(t +  ) = σ [1 − u(t)] + [1 − λw (t) ]u(t).
history of the concept. Lagos (2000) warns against the dangers of such a “reduced-form approach”
to frictions when, for example, evaluating the effects of policies. The underlying reason is that
policies may affect the search behavior of agents and change the shape of the aggregate matching
function.
11 Note that for a Poisson process, the rate λ at which the state changes need not be bounded
above by one. Since we are interested in the limiting case when the time interval,  , becomes
arbitrarily small, the probability of a state change, λ , will eventually be less than one for any
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Subtractingu(t)fromeithersideofthisexpression, dividingby , andtaking
the limit when the length of the time period goes to zero, we obtain
˙ u(t) = lim
 →0
u(t +  ) − u(t)
 
= σ [1 − u(t)] − λw(t)u(t). (2)
Here ˙ u(t)denotesthetimederivative(changeperunitoftime)ofu(t): ˙ u(t) =
∂u(t)/∂t. This equation captures that the change in unemployment is the ﬂow
into unemployment (the number of employed workers times the rate at which
theyseparate)minustheﬂowfromunemployment(thenumberofunemployed
workers times the rate at which they ﬁnd a job).
The dynamic evolution of unemployment is one of the key concerns in
this model. Notice, however, that the job-ﬁnding rate for workers, λw (t),
in equation (2) depends on vacancies through labor market tightness, θ (t).
What determines vacancies, v(t)? In order to answer this question, we need
to describe what determines proﬁts for entering ﬁrms, which in turn requires
us to discuss what wages workers receive.
With matching frictions, both workers and ﬁrms have some bargaining
power since neither party can be replaced instantaneously, as is commonly
assumed in competitive settings. There is a variety of theories that describe
how bargaining allocates output between ﬁrms and workers under these cir-
cumstances. Below we will determine wages according to the widely used
Nash-bargaining solution. For simplicity, from now on we will mainly con-
sider steady states, situations in which all aggregate variables are stationary
over time. Thus, u(t), v(t), λw(t), and λf(t) are all constant, even though
individual workers and ﬁrms face uncertainty in their particular experiences.
3. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
Values
Denote the net present value of a matched ﬁrm J (which in general would
depend on time but in a steady state does not). Given output, p,and the wage,
w, paid to its worker, J must satisfy
rJ = p − w − σ(J − V), (3)




the rate at which the ﬁrm is separated, σ, times the latter capital loss equals
J − V.12
12 This equation is written in ﬂow form but can be derived from a discrete-time formulation
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Similarly, the value of a vacant ﬁrm satisﬁes
rV =− c + λf(J − V). (4)
Here, there is a ﬂow loss due to the vacancy posting cost and an expected
capital gain from the chance of meeting a worker.
Turning to the net present value of a matched worker, W, and an unem-
ployed worker, U, we similarly have
rW = w − σ(W − U), and (5)
rU = b + λw(W − U). (6)
The ﬂow return from not working, b, could be a monetary unemployment
beneﬁt collected from the government, a monetary beneﬁt from working in
an informal market activity, or the monetary equivalent of not working in any
market activity (the value of being at home). We will discuss the role and
interpretation of b more extensively below, because it turns out that it matters
how one thinks of this parameter.
Wage Determination
The values of (un)matched workers and ﬁrms depend on the wages—yet to
be determined—paid in a match. Obviously, for a match to be maintained it
must be beneﬁcial for both the worker, W −U ≥ 0, and the ﬁrm, J −V ≥ 0.
We deﬁne the total surplus of a match, S ≡ (J − V)+ (W − U), as the sum
of the gain of the ﬁrm and worker being in a match relative to not being in
a match. We assume that the wage is set such that the total match surplus is
sharedbetweentheworkerandﬁrmaccordingtotheNash-bargainingsolution
with share parameter β:13
W − U = βS and J − V = (1 − β)S. (7)
over time from the perspective of a matched ﬁrm and that we are looking at one period being
of length  . During this period, there is production, and wages are paid, the net amount being
(p − w)  since p and w are measured per unit of time. At the end of the period, the match
separates with probability σ  and remains intact with probability 1 − σ . So it must be that
J(t)= (p −w) +(1−σ )e−r J(t+ )+σ e−r V. Here, e−r  ≡ δ( ) is a discount factor;
it gives a percentage decline in utility as a function of the length of time, −(dδ( )/d )/δ( ),
which is constant and equal to r. Subtract J(t+  )e−r  on both sides and divide by  . That
delivers J(t)−J(t+ )
  + (1−e−r )
  J(t+ ) = p−w−σe−r (J(t + )−V). Take limits as   → 0.
Then the left-hand side becomes ˙ J(t)+ rJ(t), the second term coming from an application of
l’Hˆ opital’s rule and the value being a continuous function of time. The right-hand side gives
p − w − σ(J(t)− V). In a steady state, J(t) is constant and equal to J, satisfying the equation
in the text.
13 The Nash-bargaining solution does not describe the outcome of an explicit bargaining pro-
cess; rather, it describes the unique outcome among the set of all bargaining processes whose
outcomes satisfy certain axioms (Nash [1950]). Also, one can derive the Nash-bargaining solution
as the outcome of a bargaining process where participants make alternating offers until they reach
agreement. For a survey of the bargaining problem, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Summing the value equations for matched pairs and subtracting the values of
unmatched ﬁrms and workers, using the Nash-bargaining rule, we therefore
obtain
rS = p − σS+ c − λf(1 − β)S − b − λwβS, (8)
which implies that
S =
p + c − b
r + σ + (1 − β)λf + βλw
. (9)
That is, we can express the surplus as a function of the primitives and the
matching rates, which are endogenous and will be determined by the free
entry of ﬁrms as shown below. We see that the surplus from being in a match
is
• decreasing in the interest rate (a higher interest rate reduces the present
value of remaining in the match),
• decreasing in the separation rate (a higher separation rate lowers the
expected value of remaining together),
• decreasing in the bargaining share of workers times the rate at which
theymeetvacantﬁrms(thehigherthechancethatunemployedworkers
meet vacant ﬁrms and the higher the share that workers receive in that
case, the less valuable it is to be matched now), and
• decreasinginthebargainingshareofﬁrmstimestherateatwhichvacant
ﬁrmsmeetunemployedworkers(thehigherthechancethatvacantﬁrms
meet unemployed workers and the higher the share that ﬁrms receive
in that case, the less valuable it is to be matched now).
To derive a useful expression for the wage, subtract rV from the value
equation for matched ﬁrms, (3), and use the Nash-bargaining rule to obtain
r(1 − β)S = p − w − σ(1 − β)S − rV. (10)
Also, notice that given the surplus sharing rule, (7), and the expressions for
the vacancy and unemployment values, (4) and (6), the surplus in (8) can be
written as
rS = p − σS− rV − rU. (11)
Nowmultiplyequation(11)by1−β, subtractitfromequation(10), andsolve
for the wage:
w = β(p− rV)+ (1 − β)rU. (12)
Thus, the wage is a weighted average of productivity minus the ﬂow value of
a vacancy and the ﬂow value of unemployment with the weights being β and
1 − β, respectively. Intuitively, one can understand this equation as follows:A. Hornstein, P. Krusell, and G. L. Violante: Models of Unemployment 29
w−rU, the ﬂow advantage of being matched for a worker, is just its share, β,
oftheoveralladvantageofbeingmatchedfortheworkerandtheﬁrmtogether,
β(p− rV − rU).
Firm Entry
Thereisaninﬁnitesupplyofﬁrmsthatcanpostvacancies,andentryiscostless.
Therefore, in an equilibrium with a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms posting vacancies,
the value of a posted vacancy is zero:
V = 0. (13)
If V<0, no ﬁrm would enter, and if V>0, an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms
would enter. This means that the number of vacancies, v(t), adjusts at each
point in time so that there are zero proﬁts from entering, given the matching
rate with workers, λf, which depends on u(t) and on v(t).
The free-entry condition (13), together with the deﬁnition of the vacancy





Moreover, we can use the free-entry condition to simplify the expression for
the surplus in (9); the surplus can now be expressed as
S =
p − b
r + σ + βλw
. (15)
These two expressions for the surplus can be combined to write
p − b





This is an equation in one unknown, labor market tightness (θ), since both
meeting rates (λw and λf) depend only on the number of vacancies relative to
the unemployment rate (see equation (1)).
Wealsoseethatfreeentryimpliesthatthewageexpression(12)simpliﬁes
to
w = βp+ (1 − β)rU. (17)
Equilibrium Unemployment
In a steady state, ˙ u(t) = 0, so the evolution for unemployment as given by
equation (2) becomes
σ(1 − u) = λwu. (18)
Thus, in a steady state, the ﬂow into unemployment—the separation rate in
existing matches times the number of matches—must equal the ﬂow out of
unemployment—the job-ﬁnding rate times the number of unemployed.30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The steady state expression for unemployment can, on the one hand, be
used to express unemployment as a simple function of the separation rate and
the job-ﬁnding rate. On the other hand, it can be used to write the job-ﬁnding
rate in terms of the unemployment rate and the separation rate. If we know,
for example, that the unemployment rate is 10 percent and that the monthly
separation rate is 5 percent, then the chance of ﬁnding a job within a month
must be σ 1−u
u = 0.05 · 0.9
0.1 = 0.45; that is, just under one-half.
Solving the Model
Solving the model is now straightforward. We have derived (16) and (18)
in two unknowns, θ and u. Furthermore we can solve the two equations
sequentially. First, from (1) it follows that λw (λf) is increasing (decreasing)
in θ. This, in turn, implies that the left-hand side (LHS) of (16) is decreasing
in θ and that the right-hand side (RHS) is increasing in θ. Thus, if a solution,
θ,to (16) exists, it is unique. Second, conditional on θ,we can solve (18) for
the equilibrium unemployment rate.
One can show that a solution to (16) exists if we assume that the matching
function satisﬁes the Inada conditions.14 We assume a particular functional
formforthematchingfunctionthatmeetstheseconditionsandthatisthemost
common one in the literature, the Cobb-Douglas (CD) matching function,
M(u,v) = Auαv1−α. (19)
The CD matching function has convenient properties in terms of how the
matching rates change with changes in labor market tightness,
λw = Aθ1−α and λf = Aθ−α. (20)
Independent of the level of unemployment, if the labor market tightness in-
creases by 1 percent, the rate at which a worker (ﬁrm) ﬁnds a ﬁrm (worker)
goes up (down) by 1 − α (α) percent. 15
Using the CD matching function, our equilibrium condition, (16), be-
comes
p − b
r + σ + βAθ1−α =
c
(1 − β)Aθ−α. (21)
For θ = 0, the LHS of (21) is ﬁnite and positive, and the RHS is zero. As θ
becomes arbitrarily large, the LHS converges to zero and the RHS becomes
arbitrarily large. Thus there exists a positive θ that solves (21). The unem-
14 Let f (θ) = M (θ,1). Then the Inada conditions are f (0) = 0, f (∞) =∞ , and f   (0) =
∞.
15 Shimer (2005) argues that the constant elasticity CD matching function describes the data
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ployment rate then can be solved for in a second step, using (18), as
u =
σ
σ + Aθ1−α. (22)
We obtain the wage by using the deﬁnitions of the matching rates, (20),
and substituting the expressions for rU and the value of S, (6), and (15) in
wage equation (17):







= β(p+ cθ) + (1 − β)b. (23)
A Digression: The Frictionless Model
We now show that as search frictions become small, the equilibrium of the
economy with matching frictions converges to the equilibrium of the corre-
sponding economy without matching frictions. Search frictions can become
small either because the cost of searching for vacant ﬁrms, c, becomes small
or because the efﬁciency of the matching process, A, improves.
The frictionless economy is identical to the one outlined so far, except
that matching between vacant ﬁrms and unemployed workers is instantaneous
and costless. The resource allocation problem in the frictionless economy,
which can be studied from the perspective of a benevolent social planner, is
trivial. There will always be the same number of ﬁrms as workers operat-
ing because there is no cost in creating vacancies, and the matching process
is instantaneous. Leaving workers idle would therefore be inefﬁcient since
p>b . There are no vacancies since matching is instantaneous. There is a
competitive equilibrium that supports this allocation given some wage rates,
w(t),speciﬁed at all points in time. It is clear that for these wages, w(t)must
equal p for all t because workers are in short supply, and ﬁrms are not. That
is, ﬁrm entry bids down proﬁts to zero, and workers obtain the entire output.
Now suppose that the vacancy-posting costs become arbitrarily small:
c → 0. Then for any ﬁnite θ, the LHS of (21) is strictly positive, but the RHS
converges to zero. Therefore, it must be that θ →∞ . To ﬁnd the wage, some
care must be taken, since the wage expression contains cθ, i.e., 0 ·∞ . Since
workers meet ﬁrms at an ever-increasing rate, λw →∞ , the unemployment
rate becomes arbitrarily small, u → 0, and from equation (9) it follows that
the surplus from being in a match becomes arbitrarily small: S → 0. Then
simply inspect (10), which implies that w → p, as expected: workers obtain
the whole production value.
The same kind of result is obtained if the matching efﬁciency becomes
arbitrarily large, A →∞ . Now, however, there will be no vacancies, and θ
will remain ﬁnite. To see this formally, multiply (21) with Aθ−α, divide the
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Since θ∞ = limA→∞ θ (A) is ﬁnite, the limits of both λf and λw are inﬁnite.
Thus from equation (9) it follows that the limit of the surplus is zero; from
(22) it follows that the limit of the unemployment rate is zero; and from (10)
it follows that the limit of the wage again must equal p. Since θ∞ is positive
and ﬁnite, v∞ must equal 0 since u∞ equals 0. There is no unemployment,
and there are no vacancies.
4. TRANSITION DYNAMICS
Sofar,wehavediscussedhowthekeyendogenousvariables—unemployment,
vacancies, job-ﬁnding rates, and wages—are determined in steady state. But
how does the economy behave out of a steady state? To answer this question,
one needs to ﬁnd out what the economy’s state variables are. A state variable
isavariablethatispredeterminedattimet andthatmatterstooutcomes. Here,
unemployment is clearly a state variable, because it is a variable that moves
slowly over time according to (2). In fact, it is the only state variable. No
other variable is predetermined. This means that, in general, allocations at t
depend on u(t) but not on anything else.
So what is a dynamic equilibrium path of the economy if it starts with
an arbitrary u(0) at time zero? It turns out that the equilibrium is very easy
to characterize. All variables except u(t) and v(t) will be constant over time
from the very beginning.16 To show that this is indeed an equilibrium, simply
assume that θ is constant from the beginning of time and equal to its steady
state value and then verify that all equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed. Since
θ is constant, all job-ﬁnding rates—λw(t) and λf(t)—will be constant and
equal to their steady state values because they depend on θ and on nothing
else. Since the λs are the only determinants of the values J, V, W, and U, the
solution for the values will be the same as the steady state solution. It then
also follows that the wage must be the steady state wage. To ﬁnd u(t) and
v(t), we conclude that u(t) will simply follow
˙ u(t) = σ [1 − u(t)] − λwu(t), (24)
whichdiffersfrom(2)onlyinthatλw isnowconstant. Oncewehavesolvedfor
u(t), we can ﬁnd the path for v(t) residually from v(t) = θu(t). Moreover,
note that if u(0) is above the steady state, u, the RHS of equation (24) is
negative, which means that ˙ u(0) is negative. Unemployment falls, and as
long as it is still above u, it continues falling until it reaches (converges to) u.
Similarly, if it starts below u, it rises monotonically over time toward u.17
16 Pissarides (1985; 2000, Chapter 1) shows that this is the unique equilibrium path.
17 Formally, the solution for u(t) is the solution to the linear differential equation (24): u(t) =
u + e−(σ+λw)t(u(0) − u), where u = σ
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The fundamental insight here is that there are no frictions involved in ﬁrm
entry, but there are frictions in movement of workers in and out of jobs.18
Therefore, u(t) is restricted to follow a differential equation which is “slow-
moving,” whereas v(t)does not have to satisfy such an equation. It can jump
instantaneously to whatever is has to be so that θ is equal to its steady state
value from the beginning of time.
5. COMPARATIVE STATICS
Wenowanalyzehowdifferentparametersinﬂuencetheendogenousvariables.
In particular, how does unemployment respond to changes in productivity?
Here, weemphasizethatthesearesteadystate comparisons. Weﬁndthelong-
run effect of the permanent change in the parameter. For most variables—all
except u(t) and v(t)—the impact of a permanent change in the parameter is
instantaneous because θ immediately moves to its new, long-run value (see
the discussion in the previous section). Of course, in the section below where
some of the primitives are stochastic, their changes need not be permanent,
and slightly different results apply.
For example, if we are looking at a 1 percent permanent increase in pro-
ductivity, p, the comparative statics analysis in this section will correctly
describe the effect on θ both in the long and in the short run, whereas the
effect on unemployment recorded here only pertains to how it will change in
the long run. The short-run effect on unemployment of a permanent change
in a parameter is straightforward to derive, nevertheless: It simply involves
tracing out the new dynamics implied by the linear differential equation (24)
evaluated at the new permanent value for λw (which instantaneously adopts
its new value because θ does). In particular, one sees from the differential
equation that an increase in θ will increase λw and thus increase the speed of
adjustment to the new steady state rate of unemployment.
We are mainly interested in how the economy responds to changes in p,
but we will also record the responses to b, σ, and c. We compute elasticities,
i.e., we use percentage changes and ask by what percent θ and u will change
when p,b,σ, and, c change by 1 percent. We derive the relevant expressions
by employing standard comparative statics differentiation of (21) and (22).
Using ˆ x to denote d log(x) = dx/x, it is straightforward to derive
18 The speed of movements from unemployment into employment is regulated by the hiring
rate, λw, which, in turn, depends on the endogenous market tightness, θ. Separations instead are
exogenous, and, hence, the speed of movements from employment to unemployment is simply
determined by the parameter, σ.34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
ˆ θ =
r + σ + βλw









r + σ + βλw




ˆ u = (1 − u)

ˆ σ − (1 − α) ˆ θ

. (26)
The Effect of an Increase in Productivity
From equation (25), we see that an increase in p of 1 percent leads to more
than a 1 percent increase in θ since α<1, and p>b>0. Intuitively,
p increases the value of matches, and given that ﬁrms capture some of the
beneﬁts of this increase in value, there will be an increase in the number of
ﬁrmsperworkerseekingtomatch. Thelargerthefractionofthesurplusgoing
to the ﬁrm (β small), the more vacancies and market tightness will respond to
a change in labor productivity. We also see that to the extent that b is close to
p, the effect can be large, since p/(p−b)can be arbitrarily large. Why is this
effect larger the closer b is to p? When (p − b)   0, the proﬁt from creating
vacancies is small, and θ   0. Hence, even a small change in p induces very
large changes in ﬁrms’ proﬁts and market tightness, θ, in percentage terms,
through the free-entry condition (21).
Because the job-ﬁnding rate, λw, equals Aθ1−α, we obtain that ˆ λw =
(1 − α)ˆ θ, so the effect of p on θ is higher than that on job-ﬁnding rates by
a constant factor, 1/(1 − α). If we look at the effect on unemployment, note
from(26)thata1percentincreaseinθ lowersunemploymentby(1−u)(1−α)
percent.
The Effects of Changing b, σ, and c
Changes in income when unemployed, b, have a very similar effect to pro-
ductivity changes, p, but with an opposite sign. Increasing b, in particular,
lowers θ signiﬁcantly if b is near p, but it has very little effect on θ if b is
close to zero. An increase in the match separation rate, σ, decreases labor
market tightness. More frequent separations reduce the expected proﬁts from
creating a vacancy, and, thus, θ falls. The effects on labor market tightness
of higher vacancy-posting costs, c, are negative as well. A 1 percent increase
in the vacancy cost lowers the labor market tightness (by less than 1 percent)
becauseitrequiresﬁrms’ﬁndingratestogoupinordertopreservezeroproﬁts,
and, hence, there must be fewer vacant ﬁrms relative to unemployed workers.
There is less than a one-for-one decrease because the surplus, once matched,
increases as well, as is clear from equations (14) and (15).A. Hornstein, P. Krusell, and G. L. Violante: Models of Unemployment 35
Theeffectsonthejob-ﬁndingrateofalltheabovechangesinprimitivesare
all one minus α times the effect on ˆ θ. Similarly, the effects on unemployment
are −(1 − u)(1 − α) times those on ˆ θ, with the exception of a change in σ
becausefrom(22),thetotaleffectonunemploymentofariseinσ by1percent
is twofold. The ﬁrst effect is an indirect decrease through the impact on θ (a
higher σ leads to a higher θ), which lowers unemployment. The second effect
is a direct increase of unemployment due to the higher rate at which matches
separate. Thetotaleffectcannotbesignedwithoutmoredetailedassumptions;
for example, if α ≥ 1/2, the net effect is to increase unemployment.
AnAdditional Friction: Rigid Wages
In the model just described, productivity changes arguably have such a small
impact on labor market tightness and unemployment that they cannot account
for the observed ﬂuctuations in the data. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2004)
suggestthatonewaytoaddressthisshortcomingistochangethewage-setting
assumption. We now describe a very simple model that captures this idea.
The values for workers and entrepreneurs continue to be deﬁned by equa-
tions(3),(4),(5),and(6). Now,assumethatwagesareﬁxedatsomeexogenous
level, ¯ w, such that the implied capital values for entrepreneurs and workers
satisfy J>0 and W>U . Hall (2005) justiﬁes this assumption on wage
determination as a possible sustainable outcome of a bargaining game. The













α (p −¯ w)
ˆ p. (28)
Comparing this last expression to that in equation (25), we see that the rigid-
wage model gives a stronger response. In particular, independent of b, if the
averagewage, ¯ w,islargeasafractionofoutput(i.e.,ifthelaborshareislarge),
then market tightness will be very sensitive to small changes in productivity.
The effect on unemployment, given the changes in θ, is the same whether
or not wages are rigid, as given by equation (26). Finally, a comparison of
equations (21) and (27), reveals that by choosing a value for the worker’s
bargaining power, β, close to zero in the model with Nash bargaining, one
achieves essentially rigid wages, since w is then almost the same as b.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 Parameters and Steady States for Calibrations
Common across Calibrations
r = 0.012,α= 0.72,p= 1,
A = 1.35,λ= 1.35,θ = 1,u= 0.07
Speciﬁc to Calibrations
Shimer Hagedorn & Manovskii Hall
β 0.72 0.05 NA
b 0.40 0.95 0.40
w/p 0.98 0.97 0.98
b/w 0.41 0.98 0.41
ηwp 1.00 0.50 0.00
6. CALIBRATION
In the previous section on comparative statics we demonstrated how steady
states change when primitives change. In particular, we have analyzed qual-
itatively how a permanent productivity change affects labor market tightness
(recall that the effect is the same in the short as well as in the long run) and
how it inﬂuences unemployment in the long run. However, what are the mag-
nitudes of these effects? In order to answer this question we need to assign
values to the parameters, and we will do this using “calibration.” We will,
to the extent possible, select parameter values based on long-run or micro-
economic data. Hence, we will not necessarily select those parameters that
give the best ﬁt for the time series of vacancies and unemployment, since we
restrict the parameters to match other facts.
Theparametersofthemodelareseven: β,b,p,σ,c,A,andα.Thesteady
state equations that one can use for the calibration are three: (21), (22), and
(23). Some aspects of the calibration are relatively uncontroversial, but as
we will see below, some other aspects are not. Therefore, we organize our
discussion in two parts. We ﬁrst describe how to assign values to the subset of
parameters that allows relatively little choice. We then discuss the remaining
parameters and show how, depending on what data one uses to calibrate these,
different parameter selections may be reasonable. We also explain why this is
a crucial issue—the effect of productivity changes for vacancies, and unem-
ployment may differ greatly across calibrations. We summarize the different
calibration procedures in Table 2.
Basic Calibration...
In this section, we follow the calibration in Shimer (2005). We think of a unit
oftimeasrepresentingonequarter. Therefore,itisnaturaltoselectr = 0.012,A. Hornstein, P. Krusell, and G. L. Violante: Models of Unemployment 37
giventhattheannualrealinterestrateshavebeenaround5percent. Wechoose
the separation rate, σ = 0.10, based on the observation that jobs last about
two and a half years on average.19
Job-ﬁndingratesinthedataareestimatedbyShimertobe0.45permonth.
Thus, a target for λw of 1.35 per quarter seems reasonable. Notice from
equations (25), (26), and (28) that the response of labor market tightness and
the unemployment rate to changes in productivity and other parameters does
not depend on the worker-ﬁnding rate, λf. We therefore follow Shimer and
simply normalize labor market tightness, θ = 1, so that the worker-ﬁnding
rate is equal to the job-ﬁnding rate.20
Next, consider the elasticity of the matching function: what should α be?
Shimer plots the logarithm of job-ﬁnding rates against log(v/u) and observes
something close to a straight line with a slope coefﬁcient of about 0.28, which
the theory’s formulation, λw = Aθ1−α, says it should be. Therefore, we set
α = 0.72. Since we have set θ equal to one and λw equal to Aθ1−α, it follows
that A = 1.35. From the condition determining steady state unemployment,
(22), we now obtain that 0.1(1.35−u) = u, so that u is 6.9 percent, which is
roughly consistent with the data. Notice also that the system of equilibrium
conditions is homogeneous of degree one in c, p, and b. Therefore, we
normalize p = 1 in steady state.
It remains to select c, b, and β. We have two equations left: the wage
equation,(23),andthefree-entryequilibriumcondition,(21),whichistheone
that solves for θ in terms of primitives. We can think of this latter equation as
residually determining c once b and β have been selected. Two more aspects
of the data therefore need to be used in order to pin down b and β.
...butwhat are b and β?
We now turn to the more contentious part of the calibration.
Completing Shimer’s Calibration
It is common to regard b as being the monetary compensation for the un-
employed. The OECD (1996) computes average “replacement rates” across
countries, i.e., the ratio of beneﬁts to average wages, and concludes that,
whereas typical European replacement rates can be up to 0.70, replacement
19 For a Poisson process with arrival rate σ, the average time to the arrival of the state
change is 1/σ. Thus, the average time from forming a match to separation is 1/σ = 10 quarters.
20Alternatively, we could have followed Hall (2005) and set the monthly worker-ﬁnding rate
to one so that λf = 3, implying that θ = 1/3. The value chosen for θ does not inﬂuence our
results.38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
ratesareatmost0.20intheUnitedStates.21 Shimer(2005)setsb equalto0.4,
which is even beyond this upper bound for the replacement rate since it turns
out that the wage is close to one in his calibration. One reason why b should
be higher than 0.2 is that it also includes the value of leisure associated with
unemployment. We will discuss some alternative ways to calibrate b below.
Regardingβ,itiscommontoappealtotheHosiosconditionforanefﬁcient
search.22 This condition says that in an economy like the present one, ﬁrm
entry is socially efﬁcient when the surplus sharing parameter, β, is equal to
the elasticity parameter of the matching function, α. Thus, Shimer (2005)
assumes that β = α. This is one possible choice, though it is not clear why
one should necessarily regard the real-world search outcome as efﬁcient. In
conclusion, if β = 0.72 and b = 0.4, from the free-entry condition we obtain
c = 0.324, and the calibration in Shimer (2005) is completed. Note that
Shimer does not use the wage equation in his calibration.
Alternative: Use theWage Equation
Letusnowlookatanalternativewayofcalibratingthemodelthatexploitsthe
wage equation. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) point to two observations
that arguably can be used to replace those used by Shimer to calibrate b and
β.
First, they argue that one can look at the size of proﬁts in the data. Refer-
ring to empirical studies, Hagedorn and Manovskii argue that the proﬁt share,
which they identify as (p − w)/p in the model, is about 0.03.23 That is, this
calibration strategy is equivalent to selecting a wage share a few percentage
pointsbelowone. Second,theyarguethatonecanlookathowmuchwagesre-
spond to productivity. Using microeconomic data, Hagedorn and Manovskii
conclude that a 1 percent productivity increase raises wages by half a per-
21 In the United States, unemployment insurance replaces around 60 percent of past earnings,
but in the data, unemployed workers earn much less than the average wage.
22 See Hosios (1990). Free entry of ﬁrms involves an externality since individual vacant ﬁrms
do not take into account that variations in the vacancy rate affect the rate at which they meet
unemployed workers and the rate at which unemployed workers meet them.
23A pure aggregate proﬁt measure should probably take the cost of vacancies into account,
and, as such, it should be computed somewhat differently:
((1 − u)(p − w)− vc)/(p(1 − u)) = 1 − (w/p) − θ(c/p)(u/(1 − u)).
If this expression equals 0.03, one obtains a smaller wage share, but since c must be less than
one for zero proﬁts to be feasible, w/p cannot be below 0.97 − 1 · 1 · 0.05/0.95 ∼ 0.92. Thus,
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cent.24 We now show how one can use these two observations to determine b
and β.
The wage share. The wage income share in the model is obtained by

























It is informative to calculate the wage share implied by Shimer’s calculations.











since (r + σ) is small relative to λw. Therefore, with this expression inserted




meaning that calibration of the wage share to 0.97 will not by itself be a large
departure from Shimer’s parameterization. Indeed, Shimer obtains a wage
share of w/p = 0.973.
However, there are several different choices of the pair (b/p,β) that can
achieve this value of the labor share. To see this, combine equations (29) and




(r + σ)[β + (1 − β)b/p] + βλw
(r + σ) + βλw
. (31)
Shimer chooses a relatively large value of β,which makes the wage share in
(31) close to one without imposing constraints on b/p. Alternatively, β can
be set close to zero, in which case a value for b/p needs to be around one.
Recall that with b close to p, the dynamic properties of the model change
dramatically. The model has a much stronger ampliﬁcation mechanism, but
how can one justify this choice of β?
Thewageelasticitywithrespecttoproductivity.Wedifferentiate(31)inor-
der to derive a relation between ηθp ≡ d logθ/dlogp, the percentage change
in θ in response to a 1 percent increase in p, and ηwp ≡ d logw/d logp (the
24 When we regress the cyclical component of wages on labor productivity (see Table 1 for
a description of the data), we obtain an elasticity of 0.57 with the low smoothing parameter and
0.72 with Shimer’s smoothing parameter. The ﬁrst number is higher than, but not too distant from,
Hagerdorn and Manovskii’s preferred estimate of 0.5. In particular, it is not statistically different
from 0.5.40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly








When r + σ is small relative to βλw, as in Shimer’s calibration, the elasticity









(it must be close to one if the labor share is near one). That is, Shimer’s
calibration generates a one-for-one wage increase in response to productivity,
measured in percentage terms, which is twice as large as the estimates cited
by Hagedorn and Manovskii.
To obtain such a low elasticity, one needs to decrease β, so that r + σ
is no longer small relative to βλw, and this is how Hagedorn and Manovskii
accomplish the task. A combination of (32) and the exact expression for ηθp
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
. (33)
It is now easy to see that using the baseline (uncontroversial) calibration to-
gether with w/p ≈ 1 and β = 0.13 takes us to a number for ηwp that is closer
to one-half.25 Notice also that when β is close to zero, the approximation
that ηθp ≈ p/(p − b) is no longer so good; rather, ηθp is signiﬁcantly higher
than p/(p − b), thus further strengthening the ampliﬁcation of shocks in the
model.
Put differently, if we restrict the model so that it generates a weaker re-
sponse of wages to productivity, then expression (33) tells us that β has to be
signiﬁcantly smaller. And as we saw before, that (together with a wage share
sufﬁciently close to one) totally changes the dynamics of this model.
How does the calibration inﬂuence the ampliﬁcation from productivity to
unemployment? As seen in (26), the transmission from θ to u depends only
on α and on u itself, so there is little disagreement here. The contentious
parts of the calibration do not inﬂuence this channel. That is, the differences
in the ampliﬁcation of unemployment between the alternative calibrations are
25Again, we need to remind the reader that our wage elasticity is deﬁned for a one-time
permanent change of productivity. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) base their analysis on an econ-
omy with recurrent and persistent, but not permanent, shocks. Therefore, our calibration results
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inherited from the differences in how these calibrations amplify labor market
tightness.
Some Further Remarks on Calibration
What is the value of the labor share?Apparently, relatively minor differences
in how close the wage share is to one make a signiﬁcant difference in the
results. It seems to us, however, that wage shares are very difﬁcult to calibrate
properly without having the other major input in the model, namely capital.
Of course, some search/matching models do allow an explicit role for capital.
Pissarides(2000), forexample, discussesamatchingmodelwhereﬁrms, once
they have matched, rent capital in a frictionless market for capital. Thus, a
neoclassical (or other) production function can be used, and the wage share
canbecalibratedtotheratioofwageincometototalincomeusingthenational
income accounts. The relevant wage income share, however, is then net of
capital income, and the same applies to the deﬁnition of output. Alternatively,
inHornstein,Krusell,andViolante(2005),weassumethatcapitalispurchased
in competitive markets but that an entrepreneur has to purchase capital ﬁrst in
order to be able to search for a worker—in order to qualify as a “vacant ﬁrm.”
It is an open question as to whether models with capital will also embody a
sensitivityoftheampliﬁcationmechanismtothecalibrationofthelaborshare.
What is the value for the wage elasticity? If one insists that wages are less
responsivetothecyclethanwhatisimpliedbyShimer’scalibration,thenthere
is more ampliﬁcation from productivity shocks, and the model’s implications
areclosertothedata. Hall(2005)maintainsanevenmoreextremeassumption
that wages are entirely rigid; this is why we considered a version of the model
with rigid wages. Going back to equation (28), we see that a rather extreme
outcome is produced, provided that we still calibrate so that the wage share
is close to one. Now inelastic wages and a high wage share interact to boost
the ampliﬁcation mechanism. However, the model has the counterfactual
implication that the labor share, w/p, is perfectly negatively correlated with
output while only mildly countercyclical in the data.
What is the value for the elasticity of unemployment to beneﬁts? Finally,
a possible third clue for calibrating this model can be obtained if one has
information about how the economy responds to changes in unemployment
compensation.26 Of course, the absence of controlled experiments makes it
difﬁcult to ascertain the magnitude of such effects. The upshot, however, is
thatiftheresponseofθ top islarge(becausebisclosetop),thentheresponse
ofanincreaseinunemploymentcompensationwouldbeaverysharpdecrease
in θ (and increase in unemployment). In particular, as explained in Section
5, the elasticity of the exit rate from unemployment with respect to b equals
26 This way of assessing matching models was proposed in Costain and Reiter (2003).42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
(1 − α) times ηθb. Given α = 0.72, the Hagedorn-Manovskii calibration
implies that this elasticity equals −6.3 (see Table 3). Thus, a 10 percent rise
in unemployment beneﬁts would increase expected unemployment duration
(1/λw) by roughly 60 percent.
The existing estimates of the elasticity of unemployment duration with
respect to the generosity of beneﬁts, which are based on “quasi-natural” ex-
periments, are much smaller. Bover, Arellano, and Bentolila (2002) ﬁnd for
Spain that not receiving beneﬁts increases the hazard rate at most by 10 per-
cent,implyingalocalelasticityof0.1.ForCanada,Fortin,Lacroix,andDrolet
(2004) exploit a change in the legislation that led to a rise in beneﬁts by 145
percent for singles below age 30 and estimate an elasticity of the hazard rate
around 0.3. For Slovenia, van Ours and Vodopivec (2004) conclude that the
1998 reform which cut beneﬁts by 50 percent was associated with a rise in the
unemployment hazard by 30 percent at most, implying an elasticity of 0.6.
Finally, an earlier survey by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) argues that
reasonable estimates lie between 0.1 and 1.0.
In sum, these estimates mean that the elasticity implied by the Hagedorn-
Manovskiiparametrizationisbetweensixandsixtytimeslargerthantheavail-
able estimates.
7. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS FOR THE DIFFERENT
CALIBRATIONS
In this section, we show that the three alternative calibrations discussed in
Section 6 have very different quantitative implications for the comparative
statics discussed in Section 5. Note that, although the values for certain key
parameters—β andb inparticular—aredifferent,thesteadystatevaluesofthe
key aggregate variables are the same across parameterizations. The reason,
as explained, is that certain parameters are not uniquely identiﬁed in steady
state.
Implications for θ, λw, and u
Table 3 summarizes the results for the preferred calibrations of Shimer, Hage-
dorn and Manovskii, and Hall. Recall that Hall’s parameterization has a
constant wage.
With Shimer’s calibration, the model has a very poor ampliﬁcation mech-
anism.27 A1percentpermanentriseinproductivityleadsonlytoa1.7percent
27 Though Table 3 contains information about the comparative statics of separation rates, we
focus the discussion on the effects of productivity. Shimer (2005) shows that in terms of equation
(1), most unemployment volatility in the U.S. economy is accounted for by variations in job
creation (the job-ﬁnding rate), as opposed to job destruction (the job-separation rate). Furthermore,A. Hornstein, P. Krusell, and G. L. Violante: Models of Unemployment 43
Table 3 Steady State Elasticities
Response of θλ w u
to change in pb σ pb σ p bσ
Shimer 1.72 −0.69 −0.07 0.48 −0.19 −0.02 −0.45 0.18 0.95
Hagedorn &
Manovskii 23.72 −22.51 −0.08 6.64 −6.30 −0.02 −6.18 5.87 0.95
Hall 81.70 0.00 −8.17 22.88 0.00 −2.29 −21.30 0.00 3.06
rise in market tightness, a response that is below that in the data by a factor of
16. Similarly, unemployment and the job-ﬁnding rate move very little in the
wakeofaproductivitychange. Shimerattributesthefailureofthemodeltothe
fact that, with Nash bargaining, the wage is too closely linked to productivity
and absorbs too large a fraction of the productivity ﬂuctuations. As a result,
proﬁts do not rise enough to give ﬁrms the incentive to create many additional
vacancies.
Hall’s calibration imposes a constant wage.28 The consequences of this
assumption are striking: Market tightness and unemployment respond almost
50timesmorethaninShimer’sbaselinemodel. Sincewagesareﬁxed,arisein
productivity translates entirely into proﬁts. Firms post many more vacancies,
which also boost the volatility of the job-ﬁnding rate, λw.
HagedornandManovskii’scalibration, ﬁnally, leadstothebestresultsfor
the volatility of market tightness and for the job-ﬁnding rate with respect to
productivity shocks: A 1 percent productivity increase leads to a 20 percent
increase of market tightness and a 7 percent increase of the job-ﬁnding rate.
The main problem, however, is that this calibration induces what seems to be
excessive sensitivity of u to unemployment beneﬁts b. The elasticity is about
six—almost 20 times larger than the number resulting from Shimer’s calibra-
tion. To interpret what this magnitude means, consider a policy experiment
where unemployment beneﬁts are raised by 15 percent; the unemployment
rate would then double under Hagedorn and Manovskii’s calibration.29
as Table 3 demonstrates, variations in the job-separation rate have a negligible effect on the job-
ﬁnding rate.
28 For the calibration of Hall’s sticky-wage model, we match the wage income share and the
unemployment beneﬁts from the Shimer calibration. In all other respects, the calibration is the
same as for the Shimer calibration.
29 The fact that the Hagedorn and Manovskii parameters are chosen such that wages do
not respond strongly to changes in productivity implies that wages respond strongly to changes
in beneﬁts. For the Hall calibration, wages are simply assumed to be ﬁxed, which imposes no
additional restrictions on calibration. Thus, even though wages are less responsive than under
Hagedorn and Manovskii, changes in b have no impact on the equilibrium. When wages are
ﬁxed exogenously, the level of beneﬁts is irrelevant.44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Quantitative Implications for the Cyclicality
of the Labor Share
From equation (32), it is straightforward to rewrite the elasticity of wages, w,








ˆ s =ˆ w −ˆ p,
where ηθp denotes the elasticity of θ with respect to p.
For Hall’s calibration, the implications are immediate—the model has
the counterfactual implication that the volatility of wages is zero and that
the correlation between the labor share and labor productivity is minus one.
With Shimer’s calibration, ˆ w ≈ 1.15, and, hence, wages respond one-for-
one to labor productivity, absorbing most of their impact, as explained above.
Compared to the data, wages are too volatile. The labor share is essentially
acyclical, in contrast with the data. Thus, the baseline calibration of the
matching model with a low b also fails along these two dimensions.
HagedornandManovskii’sparameterchoiceisconstructedtomatch ˆ w =
0.5, and therefore ˆ s =− 0.5. Under this parameterization, the model is quite
successful in matching the elasticity of the labor share, since in the data, the
labor share is about as volatile as labor productivity and is countercyclical.
Here, it is evident that the choice made by Hagedorn and Manovskii of setting
β near zero is useful since one can reconcile a large value for ηθp with small
ﬂuctuations in the wage and a countercyclical labor share.
8. THE MATCHING MODEL WITHAGGREGATE RISK
In the comparative statics exercise above we have studied how long-run out-
comes in our model economy respond to one-time permanent changes in
parameters. Yet we want to evaluate how well the model matches the business
cycle facts of the labor market, and the business cycle is arguably better
described by recurrent stochastic changes to parameters. For this reason we
now modify the model and include stochastic productivity shocks that are
persistent but not permanent.
One might conjecture that the difference between the effects of one-time
permanentshocksandpersistent—butnotpermanent—shockswillbesmaller,
the more persistent the shocks are. In this case the difference between the
comparative statics exercise and the analysis of the explicit stochastic model
mightbesmallsincelaborproductivityisquitepersistent. Theautocorrelation
coefﬁcient is around 0.8 (seeTable 1). It turns out that the difference between
the two approaches is noticeable, but it does not overturn the basic conclusion
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respond strongly to changes in productivity, then productivity shocks cannot
account for the volatility of the labor market.
The modiﬁed model can be analyzed in almost closed form—again
because free entry makes vacancies adjust immediately to any shock. Thus,
as before, unemployment is a state variable, but it will only inﬂuence its own
dynamics (and, residually, that of vacancies), whereas all other variables will
depend only on the exogenous stochastic shocks in the economy. Again, the
argument that backs this logic up proceeds by construction: specify an equi-
librium of this sort, and show that it satisﬁes all the equilibrium conditions.
We will focus on a simple case in which the economy switches between
a low-productivity state, p1 = p(1 − μ), and a high-productivity state, p2 =
p(1 + μ), with μ>0. The switching takes place according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate τ.30 The capital values of (un)matched ﬁrms and
workers, (3) to (6), are easily modiﬁed to incorporate the dependence on the
aggregate state of the economy:
rJi = pi − wi − σ (Ji − Vi) + τ (J−i − Ji), (34)
rVi =− c + λf (θi)(Ji − Vi) + τ (V−i − Vi), (35)
rWi = wi − σ (Wi − Ui) + τ (W−i − Wi), and (36)
rUi = b + λw (θi)(Wi − Ui) + τ (U−i − Ui), (37)
for i = 1,2, where −i denotes 1 if i = 2 and vice versa. Each value equation
now includes an additional capital gain/loss term associated with a change
in the aggregate state. We continue to assume that wages are determined
to implement the Nash-bargaining solution for the state-contingent surplus,
Si = Ji − Vi + Wi − Ui, and that there is free entry: Vi = 0.
We now apply the surplus value deﬁnition and the free-entry condition to
equations (34) to (37) in the same way as for the steady state analysis in the
previoussections. Theequilibriumcanthenbecharacterizedbythefollowing
equations:
(r + σ + τ)
c
(1 − β)λf (θi)
= pi − rUi + τ
c
(1 − β)λf (θ−i)
, and (38)
(r + τ)Ui = b +
βλw (θi)c
(1 − β)λf (θi)
+ τU−i, (39)
for i = 1,2. The idea is to see how an increase in μ from zero—when
μ = 0, we are formally in the previous model without aggregate shocks—
will inﬂuence labor market tightness: If p goes up by 1 percent, that is, μ
increases by 0.01, by how many percentage points does θ1 go down and θ2
go up? And how does the answer depend on τ? We will ﬁnd answers with
two different methods. First we will use a local approximation around μ = 0,
30 The model can easily be extended to include a large but ﬁnite number of exogenous
aggregate states.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
which allows us to derive an elasticity analytically. Then we will look at a
particular value of τ>0 and compute exact values for θ1 and θ2.
LocalApproximations
Foralocalapproximationatapointwherethetwostatesareidentical(μ = 0),
the equilibrium is symmetric such that θ1 goes down by the same percentage
amount by which θ2 goes up. For this case, we can show explicitly how the
equilibrium elasticity depends on the persistence parameter, τ. We solve for
the elasticity in two steps.
First,takingthetotalderivativeofexpression(38)withrespecttoachange
in productivity, μ yields






















where ηi ≡ (∂θi/∂μ)(1/θi) denotes the elasticity of tightness in state i with
respecttoachangeinproductivity. Sinceweconsideronlyasmallproductivity
differenceacrossstates,weapproximatethetermsincurlybracketsbythenon-
state-contingent steady state values for μ = 0. Furthermore, since everything
is symmetric, the solution is such that
η = η2 > 0 >η 1 =− η. (41)
Inspecting the results, it is easy to see that keeping the effect of productivity on
theﬂowvalueofunemploymentconstant, theabsolutevalueoftheelasticityis
higher, the lower τ is. The response of labor market tightness to productivity
is stronger, the more persistent the shock is. However, higher productivity
also raises the ﬂow value of unemployment, which hurts ﬁrms, and this effect
goes in the opposite direction.
In order to understand the latter effect, we need to solve expression (39)
for the ﬂow return on unemployment as a function of labor market tightness:




(r + τ)θi + τθ−i
r + 2τ
for i = 1,2.
We see here that if there is no discounting (r = 0), productivity would not
affecttheﬂowvalueofunemploymentsinceitwouldraiseθ2 andlowerθ1,b ut
thetwoeffectsaresymmetricandcanceleachotherout. However,discounting
results in a larger weight on the current aggregate state. To analyze the effect
in detail, take the total derivative with respect to the change in productivity,A. Hornstein, P. Krusell, and G. L. Violante: Models of Unemployment 47
Table 4 Elasticity of Tightness with Respect to Productivity, ηθp;
LocalApproximation
τ 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.50
Average Duration (in years) ∞ 25.00 12.50 5.00 2.50 0.50
Shimer 1.72 3.94 5.42 7.04 6.47 2.23
Hagedorn & Manovskii 23.67 29.28 28.24 22.12 15.49 4.42








(r + τ)ηi + τη−i
	
r + 2τ
for i = 1,2. (42)












It is apparent that with discounting (r>0), the elasticity of the ﬂow return
on unemployment is positively inﬂuenced by productivity (it goes up in state
two relative to state one), and as shocks become more persistent (as τ falls),
the effect is stronger (for a given value of η). We also see that changes in the
persistence parameter have a bigger impact on how the ﬂow unemployment
value responds to productivity when the persistence parameter is large: τ ap-
pears in the denominator so that when it is large, the effects are close to zero.
Intuitively, when there is almost no persistence, the ﬂow value of unemploy-
ment almost does not react to productivity because it is so short-lived, and
small changes in persistence become unimportant too.
Insertingexpression(43)into(40)andusingsymmetryagain, oneobtains
the following expression for the elasticity of labor market tightness:













InTable 4, we display the elasticity of labor market tightness with respect
to labor productivity for our three different calibrations and how the elasticity
depends on the persistence of the aggregate state. For the purpose of business
cycle analysis, an average duration of the state between 2.5 (τ = 0.1) and 5
years (τ = 0.05) appears to be appropriate. We see that for business-cycle
durations the results differ from the τ = 0 case, which reproduces the num-
bers from the comparative statics analysis for a one-time permanent shock. In
particular, for less-than-permanent shocks, the different calibrations produce
31 We have again approximated the state-contingent values of θi with the non-state-contingent
steady state value, θ.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 5 Elasticity of Tightness with Respect to Productivity; Exact
Solution for μ = 0.005 and τ = 0.05
1t o2 2t o1
Shimer 7.30 −6.80
Hagedorn & Manovskii 24.98 −19.93
Hall 54.52 −35.28
results that are more similar. The ampliﬁcation under Shimer’s calibration in-
creases relative to the ampliﬁcation under the alternative calibrations/models.
It remains true that with the Shimer calibration labor productivity ﬂuctua-
tions cannot account for the volatility of labor market tightness, whereas the
Hagedorn and Manovskii and Hall calibrations come close. Recall that in the
U.S. economy labor market, tightness is about 20 times as volatile as labor
productivity (see Table 1). For an arrival rate consistent with the persistence
of business cycles, τ ∈ [0.05,0.1], labor market tightness for the Shimer cal-
ibration is only seven times more volatile than productivity, whereas for the
HagedornandManovskiicalibrations, tightnessis20timesmorevolatilethan
productivity. It is 30 to 40 times as volatile for the Hall calibration.
We also conﬁrm the theoretical analysis above regarding the effects of
persistence. The table reveals that the elasticity of labor market tightness with
respect to changes in productivity is not necessarily monotone with respect
to the arrival rate of the aggregate state change. On the one hand, the more
persistent shocks are, the more a productivity increase inﬂuences the present
value revenue of the ﬁrm. As a consequence, more ﬁrms enter and labor
market tightness goes up. However, as persistence increases, so do the costs
of the ﬁrms—they are determined by the workers’ outside options—and this
effect works in the opposite direction. Moreover, as shown above, this latter
effect is a particularly important one when persistence is large but a relatively
unimportantonewhenshocksareveryshort-lived. Thus,asTable4shows,the
responseoflabormarkettightnesstoproductivityﬁrstincreasesaspersistence
goes up and then decreases when shocks become close to permanent, and the
effect on workers’outside options dominates.
Exact Solution
In Table 5 we display exact results for a case in which a switch from the
low productivity to the high productivity represents a 1 percent change in
productivity. For Shimer’s calibration, this results in a 7.3 percent increase or
a 6.8 percent reduction of labor market tightness. The approximation inTable
4 for τ = 0.05 is roughly the average of the elasticities reported in Table 5;
thus, the accuracy of the approximations is reasonable.A. Hornstein, P. Krusell, and G. L. Violante: Models of Unemployment 49
9. CONCLUSION: WHERE NEXT?
We have reviewed recent literature that assesses the ability of the search/
matchingmodelofthelabormarkettomatchsomekeycharacteristicsoflabor
markets,namely,thelargeﬂuctuationsinvacanciesandinunemployment. We
have, in particular, discussed what features of a calibration seem necessary
for matching the data within the context of the standard model or of one
augmented with an assumption that real wages are rigid. In this discussion,
wehavetentativelyconcludedthatthereisnowhollysatisfactorycalibrationof
thebasicsetuporasimplealterationthereofthatallowsthekeycharacteristics
of the data to be roughly reproduced. On the one hand, one can assume that
the value of being at home is almost as large as that of having a job, but that
seems somewhat implausible on a priori grounds, and it implies that there
must also be strong sensitivity of unemployment to unemployment beneﬁts,
which arguably we do not observe. On the other hand, one can assume rigid
wages, but we show that rigid wages necessitate a wage share close to one in
order to be powerful in creating large ﬂuctuations in labor market variables,
and this route moreover produces an excessively volatile labor share.
It is an open question as to where one might go next. In our view, it
seems important to ﬁrst examine a model with capital, because the results we
report above are very sensitive to the value of the labor share. In a model with
capital, there is no ambiguity about how one should interpret the labor share.
Moreover, amodelwithcapitaloffersanothernaturalsourceofﬂuctuationsin
vacancies and unemployment, namely, ﬂuctuations in the price of investment
goods. Such ﬂuctuations will directly inﬂuence the incentives for ﬁrms to
enter/open new vacancies, and, hence, seem a promising avenue for further
inquiry.
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